This paper studies the e ects of agent heterogeneity on optimal capital income tax rates. In a two period model with arbitrarily many heterogeneous agents, we explicitly derive the welfare e ects of taxation depending on the distribution of the agents' characteristics. In particular, we show that the sign of the optimal capital income tax rate depends not on the extent of inequality in goods endowments and productivities each b y itself, but on a measure of inequality in their joint distribution.
Introduction
The study of optimal tax systems in a dynamic framework has mainly focused on e ciency aspects. 1 In the present paper we c hoose a di erent approach, focusing on the impacts of agent heterogeneity on optimal tax rates, where taxes are collected for redistributional purposes. Under the assumption that the government maximizes a social welfare function, we ask which forms of taxation are optimal for di erent sources of inequality? How d o correlations between labor income and wealth a ect optimal tax rates?
To answer these questions we develop a two period model, in which households make laborleisure choices and decide how much to consume and how much to save. The government uses linear tax rates on labor and capital income to maximize a social welfare function. Households are heterogeneous with respect to their endowments and abilities.
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1 See, for example, Chamley 1986 and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi 1997. Remaining tractable analytically, the present model allows us to study the e ects of di erent sources of heterogeneity among households on optimal tax rates. In particular, we show that the optimal capital income tax rate in general is non-zero. It depends crucially on the joint distribution of initial wealth and productivities and on the exibility of labor income taxes over time. Furthermore, we show h o w the introduction of non-separable production functions or nonhomothetic preferences changes the optimal tax system away from zero capital income taxation.
How do our main results relate to earlier ndings on optimal capital income taxation? In nite horizon representative agent models in the tradition of Chamley 1986 show that in the long run it is not optimal to nance an exogenous stream of government expenditures through capital income taxes. However, there are a few initial periods their number depending on a possible upper bound on tax rates in which the optimal capital income tax is strictly positive, declining to zero afterwards. The main e ect of initially high levels of capital income taxes is to extract the endowments from the consumers. The government builds a large surplus in the initial periods from which it nances part of its expenditures thereafter.
A limitation of this approach is its reliance on representative agents with an in nite horizon. If there is only one agent, intragenerational distribution is not an issue. Furthermore, maximization in in nite horizon models with linear discounting often implies high tax rates in earlier periods combined with lower or zero taxes in later periods. If the in nitely long living agent i s i n terpreted as a succession of generations, this implies a high burden on earlier generations while later generations bene t. Since the di erent periods' utilities are summed over time and only the sum is maximized, intergenerational distribution is irrelevant for the optimal policy. One further limitation of most in nite horizon models is the assumption that the government is allowed to build up a substantial surplus in the early periods, which is often limited only by the assumption that taxes ought t o b e no higher than 100. Tax rates of this magnitude might be hard to implement. 2 Judd 1985 considers an in nite horizon model with two t ypes of agents. In his most general setting, the agents di er with respect to their initial endowments and utility functions. Agents are assumed to derive utility from consumption and leisure. The government has a xed stream of expenditures over time and raises revenues through capital and labor income taxation, while it redistributes through a non-negative lump-sum transfer which m a y be di erent for both types of agents. Production is weakly separable between capital and labor. Within this framework, Judd shows that if there exists a steady state then in this steady state it is not optimal to tax capital income.
Chari and Kehoe 1999 build a similar model, the main di erence being the absence of lumpsum transfers. Thus, redistribution is a side-e ect of revenue raising. They con rm Judd's results and show in addition that the assumption of a weakly separable production function is necessary for the optimality of zero capital income taxes.
While these models show that the optimal capital income tax rate in the steady state is zero, they o er little insight about optimal rates o the steady state. Our model, in contrast, considers a nite number of periods and shows that zero taxes on capital income are not optimal if, for example, goods endowments are heterogeneous.
The models discussed above assume perfectly competitive markets. There are, howeve r , a n umber of studies which analyze optimal capital income taxes in the presence of market imperfections. With few exceptions they nd that the optimal capital income tax rate is di erent from zero. Judd 1997, for example, shows how monopolistic competition among rms can lead to the optimality of a negative tax on capital income. Aiyagari 1995 and Chamley 1998 , on the other hand, nd that incomplete credit markets can lead to the optimality of a positive capital income tax rate.
The present paper does not analyze such market imperfections but shows that even with complete markets it can be optimal to impose a strictly positive tax on capital income.
The study of optimal capital income taxation is closely related to earlier work on uniform commodity taxation, such as Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 . Their static analysis can be reinterpreted in terms of a dynamic model where di erent commodities represent consumption at di erent points in time. In a setting with heterogeneous agents di ering with respect to their productivity, Atkinson and Stiglitz show that it is not optimal to distort relative prices of consumption goods if a su ciently exible income tax scheme is available. In a dynamic interpretation, their result implies that the optimal capital income tax rates are zero. However, Atkinson and Stiglitz consider only one factor of production, while there should be multiple factors of production in a dynamic settinglabor in di erent periods constitutes di erent input factors in the intertemporal production function. Thus, taxes on interest earnings not only determine relative prices but also relative w ages. Furthermore, their agents have no endowments of consumption goods and identical preferences.
Finally, our model is related to the literature on optimal linear income taxation. Given a onedimensional heterogeneity in the agents' productivities, Sheshinski 1972 shows in a static setting that the optimal marginal income tax rate is strictly positive and less than 100. The model presented in this paper considers heterogeneity in two dimensions in productivities and goods endowments and shows under which conditions the one-dimensional result holds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we develop a two period model emphasizing the interaction between the households' heterogeneity and optimal taxation. Chapter 3 derives the welfare e ects of capital and labor income taxes depending on the sources of heterogeneity among households and on their joint distribution. In chapter 4 we study the implications of time-dependent labor income taxes. The robustness of our results is examined in chapter 5, where we also compare our model with the existing literature. A conclusion is provided in chapter 6.
The model
Consider an economy existing for two periods, with N households which are heterogeneous with respect to their labor productivities n j and their non-negative endowments e j , where j = 1 ; ::; N. In each period, there is one consumption good c j 1 ; c j 2 and one type of labor l j 1 ; l j 2 . Second period's utility is discounted with the factor .
All households have identical preferences and live two periods. Their utility function is loglinear and identical in every period and across households. That is, household j's utility in period 1 can be expressed as In the rst period, each household has to decide how m uch t o w ork and how m uch to consume. It can save an amount k j and will earn interest r on its savings in the second period. There is no depreciation of capital. The wage of household j is given by its productivity n j , its labor income is l j t n j in each period t = 1 ; 2. Production is linear with rst period's output given by P j n j l j 1 and second period's by P j rk j + n j l j 2 . The government wants to maximize a social welfare function of the form P j ! j U j through linear taxation of labor and capital income, where ! j is the weight assigned to household j. Since the individual marginal utilities are decreasing in consumption and leisure, redistribution from wealthier households to poorer households increases welfareunless the government f a vors richer households, implying that the welfare weights are positively correlated with individual utility. We assume that the government cannot observe endowments and productivities directly, it distinguishes the agents only by their incomes. 3 Capital income is taxed with 1, r , and labor income with 1 , w . 4 The households get lump-sum transfers , which are identical in both periods and across households and may be either positive or negative. We assume that the government has a commitment technology. That is, once the households have made their labor leisure decisions, the government cannot change the tax rates anymore. 5 The households' budget constraint is: where inc j = + e j + w n j + + wn j 1+r r , denoting the income from household j's endowments in commodities e j and work time w n j + wn j 1+r r plus transfers. The government earns pays the same interest rate as the households on any budget surplus de cit in the rst period. 6 Letting B denote its budget, the government's budget constraint i s For an example where the government can distinguish between di erent households' ability, see Plug, Van Praag, and Hartog 1999. 4 If the government knows the amount o f i n terest earnings and wage income of an individual, it would be reasonable to believe that it could infer the size of the initial endowment. We rule this out by assumption since heterogeneous endowments are meant to represent generic di erences between individuals rather than purely monetary ones.
5 This assumption is crucial for most work on optimal taxation. For an analysis of optimal taxation without commitment see Klein and Rios-Rull 1999. 6 For ease of exposition, we assume that the government has no expenses besides redistribution. A xed revenue requirement w ould not change the results since we allow lump-sum taxes.
Given the tax rates and transfers, household j maximizes its utility subject to 3. The households' reactions to changes in parameter values are in the expected directions. Higher endowments lead to higher savings and to lower labor supply. Higher wage income n j "; w "
leads to higher labor supply and higher consumption while the e ects on savings depend on the magnitude of r r + 1 : The term r r + 1 determines the ratio of second period's leisure and consumption to rst period's leisure and consumption. As long as r r + 1 1, the households' discount rate 1 , 1 is smaller than the net interest rate r r. Thus, households shift more utility to the second period by w orking less and consuming more. If their wage income increases in both periods while rst period's goods endowment remains the same, they have to increase savings to maintain the same relation between rst and second period's consumption and leisure the ratios are constant because of homothetic preferences. Thus, savings increase in wage income if r r + 1 1, and decrease otherwise. A higher discount factor " leads to higher savings, to higher labor supply in the rst period and to a lower one in the second period. Consumption changes the opposite way. Taking the households' choices 5 to 9 as given, the maximized utility of household j depends only on ; r ; w ; n j and e j and can be written as V ; r ; w ; n j ; e j . The indirect utility function V is increasing in the household's productivity n j and in its endowment e j , since higher values of these variables lead to higher consumption and lower labor supply in both periods.
Optimal taxation
This chapter derives properties of the optimal linear tax schedule with a special emphasis on capital income taxation. Given the households' choices, the planner determines ; r , and w to maximize welfare. Letting W denote the corresponding Lagrangian, the planner's maximization problem can be written as max where is the Lagrange multiplier for the planner's budget constraint. Since we want to show that a tax rate of zero is generally not optimal, we focus on the analysis of the planner's rst order conditions, evaluated at a tax rate of zero. That is, we calculate the marginal welfare e ect of introducing labor or capital income taxes.
Let us rst consider labor income taxes. The analysis of the necessary conditions for the maximization in 10 leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given the utility and welfare functions speci ed above, and assuming that the weights ! j are uncorrelated with productivities and endowments, the labor income tax 1 , w is related to welfare as follows:
i. It is never optimal to tax away all labor income, i.e. w 0. ii. Starting from a labor income tax rate of zero, labor income taxes increase welfare i f p r oductivities are heterogeneous while endowments are not. . If the numerator is positive n j n, the denominator is larger than average, that is, positive values obtain a rather low weight. If the numerator is negative n j n, on the other hand, the denominator is smaller than average, negative v alues thus obtain a rather high weight. As a consequence, the sum is negative. The higher the inequality i n n, the lower the sum. This proves part ii of the proposition.
If productivities are homogeneous, n j = n and the rst term in the numerator is zero. The sign of 11 then is determined by the sign of , P j e j , e= + e j + w n + + w n 1+r r
. Using the same arguments as above, it follows that the sum is positive, rising in the inequality i n e. This proves part iii of the proposition. Heterogeneity i n e, for example, is measured by P e j , e inc j which can be written as C o v , e; 1 inc .
If n and e are not correlated, a rising inequality in the sense of a mean preserving spread always 7 Throughout the remainder of the text, x refers to the arithmetic average of x, that is,
8 For the derivation calculate from @W @ = 0 , plug it into @W @ w and simplify.
implies a decrease in the covariance. A positive correlation between n and e further decreases the value of the covariance while a negative correlation increases its value such that, eventually, the covariance is positive. This is the case if households with high endowments have a lower than average potential income inc j inc because of their very low productivity. Intuitively, if only productivities are heterogeneous more productive households work more than less productive ones and pay more taxes. Thus, at the margin, labor income taxation is redistributive and increases welfare. We can see this from 11 since, given labor taxes are zero, the marginal welfare e ect of an increase in labor taxes is positive, independently of capital income taxes. The magnitude of capital income taxes determines the size of the marginal improvement only through its in uence on the size of the denominator and on via the planner's budget constraint. If labor income taxes continue to increase, people work less and the pie to be divided shrinks until eventually this negative e ect of labor income taxation dominates. Redistribution thus is limited by the households' response to the increasing tax rates.
If only endowments are heterogeneous, the derivative is positive and, again, the sign is independent of the size of capital income taxes unless they are larger than 100. That is, if households have identical earning abilities while their wealth levels di er, then it is optimal to pay a subsidy on wages and to impose lump-sum taxes rather than to tax wages. The intuition goes as follows: since wealthier households generally work less, they bene t less from the subsidies while paying the same lump-sum tax.
If agents di er only with respect to their productivities, more productive agents have a higher income. This property is called agent monotonicity and implies that income taxes redistribute from highly productive agents to less productive agents since agents with high income also have a high productivity. Earlier work on optimal income taxes Sheshinski 1972, for example has shown that under this assumption the optimal linear tax schedule consists of a positive transfer and a marginal income tax rate which is strictly positive and less than one. This result is consistent with part ii of proposition 1, where agent monotonicity holds. It is violated in part iii, however, since agents with high endowments work less and thus generate less labor income than agents with small endowments. If both, endowments and productivities, are heterogeneous and uncorrelated the optimality of either taxes or subsidies depends on the relative size of the heterogeneities and on the households' relative v aluation of leisure and consumption, a. The value of a determines the relative w eights of the heterogeneities in 11.
If the welfare weights vary across households, their correlation with n and e is crucial for the determination of the optimal tax rate. If there is no correlation, the above relationships hold. A negative correlation e.g. between the weights and endowments increases the marginal welfare e ects of labor taxes, while a positive correlation decreases them and could even lead to opposite e ects. Intuitively, if the government f a vors wealthier households, who generally work less than poorer households, labor subsidies are less desirable. Now consider the tax rate on capital income, 1 , r . The following proposition establishes the main relations between the capital income tax rate and welfare.
Proposition 2 Given the utility and welfare functions speci ed a b ove, and assuming that welfare weights, productivities, and endowments are uncorrelated, the capital income tax 1 , r is related to welfare as follows:
i. a An interest income tax exceeding 100 r 0 may be optimal if the inequality in endowments exceeds a lower bound for given weights w j . b A c on scation of capital as well as interest is never optimal, i.e. 12 If !;nand e are uncorrelated, we can replace ! j by !, as shown in the proof to proposition 1. The only negative term in 12 is P j e j , e inc j . This term is large in absolute terms if the inequality in endowments is very high. Thus, the derivative i n 12 decreases in the endowments' inequality. Given the weights ! j , @ W @ r r=0 = 0 implicitly de nes a lower bound for heterogeneity in endowments which leads to capital income taxes being higher than 100. This proves part ia.
While the optimal capital income tax may exceed 100, it is never optimal to tax away all savings. If r = , 1 r , nobody saves and the planner does not collect any revenue from capital taxation. This settles part ib.
For parts ii and iii, consider the marginal welfare e ects if there are no capital income taxes r = 1 : Again, a positive v alue of the derivative indicates that capital income taxes decrease welfare while a negative v alue indicates that they increase welfare.
The arguments here are similar to those given for proposition 1. First, we can substitute ! for ! j . Second, the terms P j e j , e inc j and P j n j , n inc j are negative i f n and e vary across agents and are not correlated. If
Let us spend a few more thoughts on 13. If productivity is the single source of heterogeneity, then @ W @ r r=1 is negative as long as 1=1+r. The restriction on implies that the households' discount rate 1 , 1 is less than the interest rate r and is related to the households' optimal savings decision. If 1=1 + r more productive households save more to shift more utility to the second period and thus pay a higher amount of capital income taxes than less productive households; redistribution occurs through capital income taxes and transfers. If 1=1 + r more productive households save less and thus gain less from capital income subsidies than less productive households; redistribution occurs through capital income subsidies.
If only endowments are heterogeneous the argument is similar: households with higher endowments save more and, thus, pay more capital income taxes than households with lower endowments.
If both, endowments and productivities, are heterogeneous and if 1 + r 1 the e ects reinforce each other if n and e are positively correlated. Positive v alues of e j , e then go along with an even higher value for inc j than with no correlation. Negative v alues of e j , e go along with an even lower value for inc j than with no correlation. Thus, the negative sum decreases further if n and e are correlated. We can use the same line of arguments for the term P j n j , n inc j . If n and e are negatively correlated, the heterogeneities work in di erent directions and, thus, the marginal welfare increase through capital income taxation decreases. If people have either high endowments or high productivities, redistribution is not welfare enhancing since each household has a di erent mixture of income sources, leading to roughly the same utility levels.
The e ects of varying welfare weights again depend on correlations. If 1 + r 1 and if the weights are positively correlated with productivities and endowmentsimplying that the government favors wealthy and productive householdsthe marginal welfare e ects of capital income taxes decrease. A negative correlation, on the other hand, increases the marginal welfare e ects of capital income taxes.
To summarize, we found that the in uence of heterogeneity on the optimal tax rates depends strongly on the source of the heterogeneity and on possible correlations between the di erent sources. While labor taxes are welfare enhancing if productivities are heterogeneous, they can reduce welfare if endowments are heterogeneous. Capital income taxes increase welfare if endowments are heterogeneous while the e ect of heterogeneous productivities depends on the sign of , 1 1+r . If welfare weights vary across households, the optimal tax rates crucially depend on the weights' correlation with the households' endowments and productivities. The results con rm the intuition: if the government f a vors well-to-do households, marginal welfare e ects of taxation are lower; if it favors poorer households, they are higher.
Optimal taxation with time-dependent labor taxes
Up to now, the planner was restricted to tax labor income in both periods with the same tax rate 1 , w . The assumption of identical labor income taxes is quite restrictive, however. The present chapter modi es the above analysis so that two di erent labor income tax rates are analyzed.
1 , w1 now refers to the rst period's labor income tax and 1 , w2 to second period's labor income tax. As before, we assume that the government credibly commits to the second period's labor and capital income taxes before households make their labor leisure choices. What are the e ects on the relation between capital income taxes and welfare?
Proposition 3 Consider the setup as described above, with labor income taxes not restricted to be equal in both periods. If labor taxes are at their optimal values, then, starting from a capital income tax rate of zero:
i. An increase in the capital income tax rate has no rst order e ects if endowments are homogeneous.
ii. An increase in the capital income tax rate increases welfare if endowments are heterogeneous and the correlation between n and e is not too n e gative, given the weights ! j .
iii. An increase in the capital income tax rate decreases welfare if endowments and productivities are heterogeneous and their correlation is su ciently negative, given the weights ! j .
Proof. = 0 if endowments are homogeneous, proving part i. The derivative is negative if e is heterogeneous and not correlated with n and !. Only if there is a su ciently negative correlation, the derivative is positive since negative v alues of the sum e j e go along with very high values of n j leading to lower than average weights inc j inc. The critical level is implicitly given by P ! j e j , e inc j = 0 . This is captured in parts ii and iii of the proposition.
Proposition 3 indicates that the optimality of a positive tax rate on capital income is solely driven by heterogeneity in endowments. If households are di erent with respect to their productivities only, it is optimal not to tax capital income.
Although di erences in productivities do not call for capital income taxes by themselves, correlations of n and e play an important role. If both variables are not correlated, capital income taxes increase welfare. If they are positively correlated, the marginal welfare e ect of capital income taxation increases since households with higher interest earnings tend to be more productive as well and thus have a higher income than others. This can also be seen in 14. For given e j , a positive correlation between e and n implies that the positive terms of the sum e j , e 0 obtain an even lower weight than without correlation since not only e j but also n j are above their average values and, thus, inc j is very high. Correspondingly, the negative terms obtain a higher weight i f n and e are positively correlated.
If they are negatively correlated, the size of the marginal welfare improvement decreases since households with higher endowments tend to be less productive. For very high levels of negative correlationwhere households with higher endowments tend to have lower overall utility than others because of their low productivityit is desirable to pay i n terest subsidies instead of imposing taxes. Again, this can be seen in 14. If positive v alues of e j , e go along with very low v alues 9 For the derivation of this expression see Appendix A.1. of n j , the corresponding inc j might b e l o wer than average. That is, the argument given above i s reversed: positive v alues of e j , e obtain a high weight low inc j while negative v alues obtain a low w eight high inc j and the sum is positive; the introduction of capital income taxes decreases welfare. 10 If the weights are not identical across households, correlations again play an important role. A negative correlation between weights and endowments or productivitiesimplying that the government f a vors poorer householdsstrengthens the marginal welfare improvement of capital income taxation. A positive correlation, on the other hand, lowers the positive impact of capital income taxation. For high levels of positive correlationimplying that the government strongly favors the wealthy and productive householdsthe marginal welfare impact of capital income taxation can become negative, making it optimal to subsidize interest income.
How does this compare to the literature? For one thing, we can interpret consumption and leisure in di erent periods as di erent goods and thus obtain results in line with Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 . Their agents di er only with respect to productivities and they nd that uniform commodity taxation is optimal. Furthermore we nd that if heterogeneity is one-dimensional if either only endowments or only productivities are heterogeneous the tax rate on the respective source of income is positive, which is compatible with the ndings in Sheshinski 1972 . If the heterogeneity i s t wo-dimensional, this result no longer holds. For example, it might be optimal to subsidize labor income if endowments and productivities are negatively correlated. The in uence of heterogeneity on the welfare e ects of capital income taxation is also shown by Domeij and Heathcote 2000, who examine the quantitative e ects of eliminating capital income taxes. They nd that if households are heterogeneous, a vast majority prefers the original tax system. If the population is homogeneous, however, a tax cut would be preferred.
The comparison with the steady state results of in nite horizon general equilibrium models Judd 1985, Chari and Kehoe 1999, for example, shows that while the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the steady state, this result does in general not hold o the steady state. In this respect the optimal tax scheme di ers from the analysis of representative agents as e.g. in Chamley 1986 , where the tax rate is zero after a certain point in time, independent of the existence of a steady state. For a closer comparison between the di erent approaches see chapter 5. Now consider labor income taxes. A question which comes to mind is whether it is optimal to tax labor income in both periods at the same rates. If not, which rate ought to be higher?
ii To get some intuition for this result, assume endowments are homogeneous. More productive households then work more than less productive ones in both periods. If 1 + r r 1, all households work more in the rst period than in the second period. As a consequence, taxes in the rst period lead to more revenues than taxes in the second period and are more e ective for redistribution.
If productivities are homogeneous, labor income taxes are related such that the present-value taxes on labor income in both periods w1 for the rst period and w2 1+r 1+r r for the second periodare identical. In other words, the optimal labor income taxes cancel out the distorting e ects of capital income taxes on the labor supply.
How do these results compare with the previous chapter? The expressions determining the marginal welfare impact of capital income taxes are very similar equations 13 and 14. Optimal capital income taxes are largely determined by the correlation between endowments and productivities in both cases. If the planner is restricted to identical labor taxes in both periods, capital income taxes are employed to substitute for the loss of exibility. That is, even if endowments are homogeneous, the planner will tax interest income. If he can vary labor income taxes over time, it is optimal for him not to tax capital income 5 Robustness
The preceding chapter has established properties of optimal tax rates in a two period model, in which the analysis has been based on logarithmic preferences and linear production. The present chapter asks whether a relaxation of these assumptions would change these properties and compares our model with the di erent sets of assumptions in the existing literature. Section 5.1 shows under which conditions optimal capital income tax rates o the steady state can be zero, and section 5.2 shows how and why the necessary sets of assumptions di er with time-separable utility and in the steady state. Finally, section 5.3 brie y discusses the changes of optimal labor income taxes over time.
Optimal capital income tax rates o the steady state
The existing literature provides little analysis of optimal capital income taxation with heterogeneous agents o the steady state. 11 However, there is a body of literature based on Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 that considers optimal taxation with multiple factors and heterogeneous agents. Their results are relevant for our analysis since labor in di erent periods and endowments may be interpreted as di erent factors of production. 12 Our results presented in chapters 3 and 4 go beyond their conclusions; these papers show, however, under which conditions optimal tax rates are zero. Applying the results of this literature to a dynamic setting, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose there is an arbitrary number of agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their productivities and goods endowments. Utility is separable between leisure and consumption and is strictly concave in all arguments. A s o cial planner sets linear tax rates on labor and capital income and distributes lump-sum transfers to maximize welfare, which is de ned as the sum of all agents' utilities. Starting from a capital income tax rate of zero, an increase in the capital income tax rate has no rst order e ects if all of the following four conditions hold.
i. Preferences for consumption are homothetic.
ii. Preferences for consumption are identical for all households.
iii. Goods endowments are homogeneous or proportional to actual consumption. 13 iv. Production is weakly separable between labor and capital or agents have identical productivities.
If utility is weakly separable between consumption and leisure, conditions i and ii r equire that preferences for consumption and leisure a r e homothetic and identical.
Items i to iii correspond to the ndings in Bassetto 1999. 14 In a setting similar to Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 , he analyzes properties of optimal commodity taxes for general homothetic and separable utility functions. His model considers two t ypes of agents, of whom only one works, and he nds that homothetic and identical preferences as well as homogeneous or proportional endowments are necessary for the optimality of uniform commodity taxes or, in a dynamic interpretation, for a zero tax on capital income. Thus, the relevant assumption in our model is not the log-linearity of preferences per se but the implicit homotheticity. While we also assumed strongly separable utility, again we nd that this assumption is not necessary. Appendix A.2.1 shows that weakly separable utility is su cient if utility is homothetic in all arguments.
Item iv of proposition 5 is analogous to the results of Naito 1999. Re-examining optimal commodity taxation in a setting close to Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976, he shows that the optimality of uniform commodity taxes is not robust against the introduction of production functions that are not weakly separable between labor and consumption. Thus, the linearity of production by itselfas assumed in our modelis not necessary for the optimality of a zero tax rate on capital income. The optimal tax rate is zero as long as production is weakly separable between capital and leisure.
In the two period model delineated in chapter 2, items i; ii, and iv of proposition 5 hold. Proposition 3 shows that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero only if endowments are homogeneous corresponding to item iii, while it is generally non-zero for heterogeneous endowmentswith the exception of a negative correlation between endowments and productivities that is just large enough to cancel out the e ects of capital income taxes on welfare. Thus, our earlier ndings are compatible with the literature summarized in proposition 5. For a formal derivation of proposition 5, see appendix A.2.1.
The following paragraphs discuss the individual conditions of proposition 5 and show w h y each o f them is necessary for the optimality of a zero tax on capital income.
Homogeneous goods endowments Heterogeneous endowments distort the optimality of uniform taxation since they lead to di erent i n tertemporal trading patterns among agents. If wealthier agents have higher capital holdings due to higher endowments, a taxation of capital income extracts high revenues from the wealthier agents which can be used for redistribution. These tax payments are directly related to di erences in endowments that are generally not captured by the revenues of linear labor income taxes which are proportional to productivities.
Homothetic and identical preferences If preferences are not homothetic, luxury goods may exist. That is, wealthier agents consume disproportionately more of the luxury goods than poorer agents. Thus, while labor income taxes are proportional to the agents' productivities, higher tax rates on the luxury good disproportionately tax the wealthy and thus provide a means to redistribute. In a dynamic interpretation this example translates as follows. If, for example, the desire for consumption in later periods increases with income, wealthier households save disproportionately more than poorer ones. A tax on capital income therefore disproportionately a ects the wealthy. If preferences di er across households, a similar mechanism works.
If preferences are strongly separable between consumption and leisure, homotheticity is required for consumption goods only since there is no interaction between utility from consumption and leisure. If preferences are weakly separable, however, homotheticity is required for all elements of the utility function. If leisure in later periods is a luxury good, consumption in di erent periods is not proportional for households with di erent productivities.
Homothetic preferences, however, are required for zero capital income taxes being optimal only in the presence of linear labor income taxes. In the setup of Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 , labor income taxes are non-linear and the authors nd that uniform commodity taxation is optimal if preferences are weakly separable between consumption and leisure. Homotheticity is not required for this result, since non-linear labor income taxes already provide a means to tax the wealthy disproportionately. Even if there are luxury goods, an additional tax on these will not improve welfare if labor income taxes follow an optimal disproportionate scheme.
Weakly separable production The last requirement in proposition 5 concerns the production side of the economy. To see why this assumption is important, consider the following example. Let the production function be such that rising capital usage in production implies the decrease of relative productivity o f l o w productivity households. If this is the case, the government might want to discourage capital accumulation by taxing capital income in order to prevent a higher discrepancy in relative productivities. In other words, if production is not weakly separable between labor and capital, capital income taxes might in uence relative productivities. As a consequence, non-zero capital income taxes can be optimal even if endowments are homogeneous and preferences are homothetic and identical across households.
Time separable utility and optimal taxation in the steady state
The results presented in chapters 3 and 4 are based on time separable utility functions. How d o e s this assumption modify the requirements for the optimality of a zero tax on capital income as presented in proposition 5? Which further changes occur in the steady state?
Proposition 6 Consider the same setting as in proposition 5 and assume utility is time-separable. Starting from a capital income tax rate of zero, an increase in the capital income tax rate in period t has no rst order e ects if all of the following conditions hold.
i. Preferences for consumption are homothetic and identical for all households.
ii. Goods endowments in periods t and t , 1 are homogeneous or proportional to actual consumption.
iii. Production is weakly separable between labor and capital or agents have identical productivities.
In the steady state, item iii is su cient for an increase in the capital income tax rate to have no rst order e ects.
While homotheticity and weakly separable production are required for the same reasons as before, time separability limits the e ects of heterogeneous endowments to two periods. Capital income taxes in the period with heterogeneous endowments are used to redistribute while next period's capital income taxes ensure that relative prices in all following periods are not a ected. Longer lasting e ects occur only if the capital income tax rate is restricted, for example, to be no larger than 100. 15 The mechanisms working in the steady state are similar to those o the steady state. Weakly separable production ensures that capital income taxes do not change relative productivities. The necessity of this assumption for the optimality of a zero tax on capital income has been shown by Stiglitz 1985 and Chari and Kehoe 1999 . Homotheticity is not required in the steady state since consumption is constant by de nition, that is, it is not possible to disproportionately tax some households by varying the tax rate in di erent periods. By de nition, there are also no heterogeneous endowments in the steady state. Because of time-separable utility, heterogeneous endowments in earlier periods have no e ect on the optimal capital income tax rate in the steady state. For a formal treatment, see appendix A.2.3.
Optimal labor income taxes o the steady state
In chapter 2 we h a ve shown that the optimal labor income taxes are generally non-zero and vary over time. These results are in line with most of the literature since optimal labor income taxes are generally found to be positive and variable over timesee for example Chari and Kehoe 1999 and Chamley 1986. If productivities are homogeneous, however, we nd present v alue labor income taxes are constant for all periods. The following proposition shows under which conditions this conclusion remains valid in a more general setting.
Proposition 7 Consider the same setting as in proposition 5. A departure from uniform labor income taxation has no rst order e ects on welfare if all of the following conditions hold.
i. Preferences for leisure a r e linearly homogeneous.
ii. Preferences for leisure a r e identical for all households.
iii. Productivities are homogeneous.
The intuition behind the conditions is similar to the discussion in the previous sections. Homothetic and identical preferences ensure that the relative labor supply in di erent periods does not vary across households with di erent w ealth. Thus, varying labor income taxes over time would not tax wealthy households disproportionately. If productivities are heterogeneous, homothetic preferences are not su cient to ensure a proportional labor supply for all households. Homogeneity of endowments, however, is irrelevant for the optimality of uniform labor income taxation. For a formal analysis see appendix A.2.2. Proposition 7 con rms the ndings from our two period model that it is not optimal to distort relative w ages if productivities are homogeneous see proposition 4 iii. Again, we nd that not the assumption of log-linear preferences per se but the implicit homotheticity drives the result.
Conclusion
The analysis in the previous chapters shows that heterogeneity among households considerably in uences optimal tax rates. While steady state analyses such as Judd 1985 have found that the optimal capital income tax rate in the steady state is zero, we show that o the steady state this is generally not the case.
In a two period model with arbitrarily many heterogeneous households, we nd that if households are heterogeneous with respect to productivities and endowments, capital income taxes generally increase welfare. If they are heterogeneous only with respect to productivities, endowments being identical for all, it is optimal not to tax capital income. The extent o f t h e inequality and the joint distribution of its di erent components productivities and endowments in our model are crucial for the size of the marginal welfare e ects of taxation. A positive correlation between endowments and productivities increases the marginal welfare e ects of capital income taxation, while a negative correlation decreases the e ects. Thus correlation of the households' characteristics plays an important role in determining the optimal tax policy.
Throughout the paper we emphasize the analogy between commodity taxes and capital income taxes, which e ectively tax consumption goods at di erent points in time. Checking the robustness of our results with the help of the literature on optimal commodity taxation, we nd that zero capital income taxation is optimal if endowments are homogeneous, if production is weakly separable between labor and capital, and if utility functions are homothetic and identical across agents. When we link our model to the in nite horizon steady state analyses as found in Judd 1985 and Chari and Kehoe 1999, we nd that the models are compatible if we make appropriate assumptions.
In sum, we nd evidence that if the planner maximizes a social welfare function and wants to redistribute, capital income taxes might b e a g o o d w ay to do so.
A Appendix
A. 
A.2 Derivation of Propositions 5 to 7
The model in this section is an extension of Bassetto 1999. 16 There are N households, preferences are separable between consumption and leisure. Household j's utility is given by U j G j c j ; H j 1 , l j ; 16 where G j is its subutility from consumption, and H j is its subutility from leisure. 17 c j = c j 1 ; c j 2 ; : : is the vector of its consumption with c j t being household j's consumption in period t, while l j = l j 1 ; l j 2 ; : : is the vector of its time spent w orking with l j t being household j's work time in period t. The endowment of time is one for each household in every period. The intertemporal technology constraint is given by 17 where g is government consumption and F is assumed to be twice continuously di erentiable, increasing in the rst argument and decreasing in labor. In the following, we use the primal approach or Ramsey approach to determine properties of optimal tax rates. 18 The rm produces consumption goods c t , sells them at a price q t and pays wages w j t . Wages are per unit of time and di er across households. is independent of t. The following paragraphs examine under which conditions uniform commodity taxation is compatible with the planner's necessary conditions.
The rst order condition w.r.t. implies P j j = 0 . Thus, all terms containing drop out of the remaining rst order conditions. The derivative of the welfare function with respect to c 1 t can be written as Consequently, the constraint on the equality of marginal rates of substitution is not binding and indeed j k = 0 8k;j.
Thus we h a ve shown that the necessary conditions for the Ramsey problem outlined above hold with a capital income tax of zero if conditions i to iv of proposition 5 hold.
Weakly separable utility This section shows how w eakly separable utility c hanges the requirements for the optimality of a zero capital income tax. Utility is denoted by U j c j ; 1 , l j . For ease of exposition, assume that production is weakly separable between labor and capital and that endowments are homogeneous. The equivalent of 24 then has the following form: As before, this term is zero if the above conditions hold.
The only di erence to the earlier analysis with strongly separable preferences is that homotheticity is needed for all elements of the utility function.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 7
This section derives properties of the optimal labor income taxes over time. Labor income taxes are determined by wt = If utility is time separable, The rst term on the r.h.s is a multiple ofG 1 t , where X is independent o f t. Since G 1 t is independent of t in the steady state, this term is time invariant. The second term is zero if endowments in period t are homogeneous since P j j = 0 . In other words, if endowments are distributed only in period one, time separable utility implies that heterogeneous endowments have no e ects on capital income taxes beyond period two. P j j P k G 1 kt c j k :
There are two cases when this expression is zero. Firstly, if utility is homothetic and identical across agents, G 1 t 2 U 1 11 + G 1 tt U 1 1 . The term in parentheses is the second derivative of utility w.r.t. consumption at time t. If utility is separable across time and between labor and consumption, this term depends only on c t and is time invariant in the steady state. As before, this term is zero if the above conditions hold.
The preceding paragraphs have shown that if preferences are time-separable, heterogeneous endowments do not in uence optimal capital income taxes in later periods. Starting from zero capital income taxes, an increase in capital income taxes has no rst order e ects if preferences are homothetic. If we are in a steady state, there are no rst order e ects even if preferences are not homothetic.
